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Statutes
of Limitations
Subject to an exception discussed below, a medical malpractice
action must be brought within two years from the date of the alleged
act, omission, or neglect. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-7-1 (West
Supp. 1998). A minor under the age of six years has until his eighth
birthday to file. Id. No other instance of minority or other
legal disability tolls the medical malpractice statute of limitations.
Id. Wrongful death actions arising out of medical malpractice
are subject to the medical malpractice limitations period. Yarnell
v. Hurley, 572 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
The Indiana Supreme Court recently resolved a conflict among lower
court decisions as to the validity of the two-year statute. It held
that the statute is constitutional on its face, but that it cannot
be constitutionally applied in cases where the long latency period
of a medical condition prevents the injured party from discovering
the malpractice within two years. Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d
1273, 1279 (Ind. 1999) (failure to diagnose breast cancer). When
this exception applies, plaintiff may file within two years from
the discovery of the malpractice and resulting injury, or from learning
facts that, with reasonable diligence, should have led to such discovery.
Van Dusen v. Stotts, No. 03S00-9711-CV-631, 1999 WL 463489
(Ind. July 8, 1999). See also Ledbetter v. Hunter,
652 N.E.2d 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (questioning the constitutionality
of the statute as it applies to minors).
Contributory
or Comparative Negligence
Most medical malpractice actions in Indiana are brought under the
terms of the Medical Malpractice Act, which was formerly codified
at Ind. Code Ann. §§ 27-12-1-1 to 27-12-18-2, but which was
moved in 1998 to Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-18-1-1 to 34-18-18-2
(West Supp. 1998). This act governs actions against "qualified
providers," a term that is discussed below in Patient
Compensation Funds and Physician Insurance and that refers
to participants in the state-sponsored excess insurance program.
Not all health care providers participate, however. It is therefore
important to distinguish, in this section and others, between laws
that apply to cases brought under the Medical Malpractice Act and
those that apply in other cases.
In cases brought under the Medical Malpractice Act, contributory
negligence is held to be a complete defense that bars any recovery
by plaintiff. King v. Clark, 709 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999); Smith v. Hull, 659 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995). A patient has a duty to exercise reasonable care,
which includes providing his doctor with accurate and complete information
and following the doctor's instructions. Smith, 659 N.E.2d
at 191.
In other cases, the Comparative Fault Act provides for a modified
form of comparative negligence. Recovery is barred if the claimant's
fault exceeds 50 percent of the total fault. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-51-2-5
to 34-51-2-8 (West Supp. 1998). However, the Comparative Fault Act
does not apply to medical malpractice claims against qualified providers
or to tort claims against governmental entities or public employees.
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-51-2-1 and 34-51-2-2 (West Supp. 1998).
Joint
and Several Liability
Prior to the adoption of the Comparative Fault Act, it was the
rule in Indiana that defendants who engaged in separate and independent
acts of negligence that combined to cause a single injury were jointly
and severally liable. Sanders v. Cole Municipal Finance,
489 N.E.2d 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). It appears that this rule continues
to apply to those persons and entities not covered under the Comparative
Fault Act, including qualified providers sued under the Medical
Malpractice Act. See Smith v. Pancner, 679 N.E.2d 893 (Ind.
1997).
In cases covered by the Comparative Fault Act, the trier of fact
allocates liability on the basis of individual fault and a several
judgment is granted against each defendant. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-2-8
(West Supp. 1998).
Contribution
Both the common law of Indiana and the Comparative Fault Act prohibit
contribution among joint tortfeasors. Mullen v. Cogdell,
643 N.E.2d 390, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-2-12
(West Supp. 1998).
Vicarious
Liability
The Indiana Supreme Court recently adopted an interpretation of
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 to hold that a hospital
may be liable, under the theory of apparent or ostensible agency,
for the negligence of a physician acknowledged to be an independent
contractor. The court focused on the reasonableness of the patient's
belief that hospital employees were rendering care. It held that
a hospital will be deemed to have held itself out as the provider
of care and the patient to have relied on this representation unless
the hospital gives notice that the physician is an independent contractor,
generally by providing written notice at the time of admission,
or the patient has some special knowledge of the physician's independence,
as through a relationship pre-dating the hospital treatment. Sword
v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., No. 10S05-9610-CV-637, 1999 WL 512010
(Ind. June 25, 1999). In addition, cases prior to the adoption of
the apparent agency theory held that if a hospital is aware that
the care a physician is providing has deviated from normal practice,
its personnel must either question the physician's orders or inform
the proper authorities. Yaney v. McCray Memorial Hospital,
496 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
If a qualified provider is found liable solely due to the negligence
of an agent or employee who is also a qualified provider, its liability
for itself and the agent or employee is limited to one damage cap
amount ($100,000 for acts prior to July 1, 1999, $250,000 thereafter),
not two. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-14-3(d) (West Supp. 1998).
Expert
Testimony
Expert testimony is necessary to establish what the standard of
care is and whether the defendant has conformed to it, unless the
issue of care is one commonly understood by lay persons. Culbertson
v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 104 (Ind. 1992); Stumph v. Foster,
524 N.E.2d 812, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (expert not needed when
chiropractor broke the patient's rib). Under the Medical Malpractice
Act, cases are ordinarily heard before trial by a medical review
panel that includes qualified physicians, and the opinion of one
of the members of such a panel (even a dissenting member) is sufficient
to make a prima facie case. Bonnes v. Feldner, 642
N.E.2d 217, 221 (1994). The panel's report is admissible but not
conclusive at trial, and any member can be required to testify as
an expert at trial. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-10-23 (West Supp.
1998). A plaintiff, therefore, may be able to get his case to the
jury without a retained expert.
Damage
Caps
The caps on recoveries in medical malpractice claims against qualified
providers have increased substantially under new legislation scheduled
to take effect in cases arising out of acts of malpractice that
occur on or after July 1, 1999. For claims accruing prior to January
1, 1990, the amount recoverable against a single qualified provider
may not exceed $100,000, and the total amount recoverable against
all qualified providers and the Patient Compensation Fund may not
exceed $500,000. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-14-3 (West Supp. 1998).
As of January 1, 1990, the maximum recoverable from all qualified
providers and the Fund was increased to $750,000. Id. For
claims accruing on or after July 1, 1999, the limit for each qualified
provider is $250,000, and the total cap on damages against all qualified
providers and the Fund is $1,250,000. Id. See discussion
in Patient Compensation Funds and Physician Insurance.
The original version of the cap was held to be constitutional in
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, 273 Ind. 374, 394-401, 404
N.E.2d 585, 598-602 (1980).
The Medical Malpractice Act authorizes only one recovery in those
cases where a single injury exists, even when multiple acts of malpractice
caused the injury. However, if there are two separate and distinct
injuries caused by two separate occurrences of malpractice, the
statute does not preclude two separate recoveries. Miller v.
Memorial Hospital, 679 N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (Ind. 1997). There
is no damage cap in cases not brought against qualified providers.
Statutory
Cap on Attorneys' Fees
A claimant's attorney may not receive more than fifteen percent
of any award from the Patient Compensation Fund. Ind. Code Ann.
§ 34-18-18-1 (West Supp. 1998). There is no cap on attorneys'
fees in cases not brought against qualified providers.
Periodic
Payments
The Medical Malpractice Act allows for, but does not require, the
periodic payment of a medical malpractice judgment. Ind. Code Ann.
§ 34-18-15-1 (West Supp. 1998).
Collateral
Source Rule
In personal injury or wrongful death cases, proof is admissible
of all collateral source payments except the following: (a) payments
of life insurance or other death benefits, (b) insurance benefits
for which the claimant or his family paid directly, and (c) payments
made by Indiana or the United States prior to trial to compensate
the claimant for his loss. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-44-1-2 (West
Supp. 1998). The claimant may introduce evidence of any repayment
of collateral source benefits he is required to make, and the claimant
may offer proof of the cost to the claimant or his family of collateral
benefits. Id.
Pre-Judgment
Interest
Indiana law provides for pre-judgment interest in most tort actions.
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-4-7 (West Supp. 1998). The court must
set the rate at not less than six percent and not more than ten
percent simple interest. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-4-9 (West Supp.
1998). Such interest cannot be awarded for claims against the Patient
Compensation Fund or the state and its political subdivisions. Ind.
Code Ann. §§ 34-51-4-2 and 34-51-4-4 (West Supp. 1998).
The period during which pre-judgment interest accrues may not exceed
48 months. It begins on the latest of (a) fifteen months
after the cause of action accrued; (b) six months after the suit
is filed, if the action need not be submitted to a medical review
panel; or (c) 180 days after a medical review panel is formed to
review the claim. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-4-8 (West Supp. 1998).
Pre-judgment interest may not be awarded if, within one year after
the suit is filed, (a) defendant makes an offer equal to at least
two thirds of the judgment, or (b) plaintiff fails to make a demand
that exceeds the judgment by no more than one third. Ind. Code Ann.
§§ 34-51-4-5 and 34-51-4-6 (West Supp. 1998).
Patient
Compensation Funds and Physician Insurance
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act establishes a Patient Compensation
Fund that functions as a system of excess insurance for health care
providers. To become a "qualified provider," entitled
to the benefits of the Act, a health care provider must file proof
of financial responsibility and pay the surcharge assessed by the
Commissioner of Insurance to support the Fund. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-18-2-24.5
and 34-18-3-2 (West Supp. 1998). A qualified provider establishes
financial responsibility by purchasing malpractice liability insurance.
Effective July 1, 1999, required limits for physicians are $250,000
per occurrence and $750,000 in the annual aggregate, while required
limits for hospitals are $250,000 per occurrence and $5,000,000
in the annual aggregate, if the hospital has not more than one hundred
beds, or $7,500,000 in the annual aggregate, if the hospital has
more than one hundred beds. (Other aggregate limits are prescribed
for other health care entities.) Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-4-1
(West Supp. 1998). The limits required as of July 1, 1999, are two
and one-half times the previous limits. Hospitals may qualify with
a self-insurance plan at the discretion of the Commissioner. Id.
The maximum liability of a qualified provider for an occurrence
is limited to the amount of required insurance. The Patient Compensation
Fund is liable for the excess over what is owed by all the qualified
providers, up to an overall damage cap. See discussion in Damage
Caps for specific amounts, which have changed over time.
Id. The Fund also covers amounts in excess of the required
aggregates and amounts owed by insurers that fail to pay. Ind. Code
Ann. §§ 34-18-6-6 and 34-18-15-4 (West Supp. 1998).
The Medical Malpractice Act was held to be constitutional in Johnson
v. St. Vincent Hospital, 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
Immunities
By statute, Indiana provides sovereign immunity in specific cases
to governmental entities and their employees acting within the scope
of their employment. A governmental entity includes the state, counties,
separate municipal corporations, state colleges and universities,
and city or county hospitals. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-6-2-49 and
34-6-2-110 (West Supp. 1998). Of nineteen listed actions or conditions
that do not create liability for a governmental entity or its employees,
the following three might be relevant in medical malpractice actions:
(a) the performance of a discretionary function; (b) the act or
omission of someone other than a governmental entity employee (i.e.,
an independent contractor); and (c) injury to the person or property
of a person under the supervision of a governmental entity who is
on probation or has been assigned to an alcohol and drug services
program. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-13-3-3 (West Supp. 1998).
Claims against units of government are barred unless notice is
filed with the Attorney General or state agency within 270 days
of the loss, in the case of the state, or with the political subdivision
within 180 days, in the case of political subdivisions. Ind. Code
Ann. §§ 34-13-3-6 and 34-13-3-8 (West Supp. 1998). The maximum
combined liability of all governmental entities and all public employees
acting within the scope of their employment for an injury or death
arising out of a single occurrence is $300,000 per person and $5
million for all persons. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-13-3-4 (West Supp.
1998).
If a government entity or government employee qualifies under the
Medical Malpractice Act, by the means discussed in Patient
Compensation Funds and Physician Insurance, then all actions
against that entity or person are covered by the provisions of the
act. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-3-4 (West Supp. 1998).
Arbitration
All claims for more than $15,000 against qualified providers under
the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act must be heard by a medical review
panel (unless each party executes a written waiver). Ind. Code Ann.
§ 34-18-8-4 to 34-18-8-6 (West Supp. 1998). A medical review
panel consists of one lawyer and three health care providers. Ind.
Code Ann. § 34-18-10-3 (West Supp. 1998).
It is the duty of the health care providers on the panel to express
an expert opinion as to whether the evidence supports the conclusion
that the defendant(s) acted or failed to act within the appropriate
standards of care and, if so, whether that was a factor in the injury.
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-10-22 (West Supp. 1998). The opinion
issued by the panel is admissible as evidence in any subsequent
action, but it is not conclusive. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-10-23
(West Supp. 1998).
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